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Abstract This paper explores what insights can be drawn
from critical theory to enrich and strengthen Sen’s capa-
bility approach in relation to technology and human
development. The two theories share some important
commonalities: both are concerned with the pursuit of ‘‘a
good life’’; both are normative theories rooted in ethics and
meant to make a difference, and both are interested in
democracy. The paper provides a brief overview of both
schools of thought and their applications to technology and
human development. Three areas are identified where
critical theory can make a contribution to the capability
approach: conceptually, by providing a critical account of
individual agency and enriching the concept of technology
beyond the simplistic notion of commodities; methodo-
logically, by sensitising towards reification and hegemony
of scientific tools, and, finally, by emphasising reflexivity
of researchers.
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Capabilities  Technology
Introduction
Amatya Sen’s capability approach (CA) is based on the
critique of opulence-focused approaches (focused on
income, commodity command) or utilitarian approaches
(focused on happiness, desire-fulfilment) which are typi-
cally found in traditional welfare economics (Sen 1985a).
The word ‘‘capability’’ as used by Sen differs from its
everyday sense which usually refers to trained potentials,
including skills, abilities and aptitudes. Rather, ‘‘capabil-
ity’’ in Sen’s approach reflects the real opportunities
(environmental opportunities and individual abilities) that a
person has to lead a life he or she values (Gasper 2007).
Deneulin (2006) summarises three ‘‘cornerstones’’ that
Sen’s CA is built upon: First, its concern with ‘‘the
expansion of freedom… both as the primary end and as the
principle means of development’’ (Sen 1999, p. xii). Sec-
ond, the centrality of ‘‘individual agency’’ in addressing
human deprivation. Third, its emphasis on participation.
Sen’s capability approach (CA) has made major con-
tributions in the research on and practices of human
development in areas like poverty alleviation, gender
equality, and democracy. In recently years, the CA starts to
be adopted to investigate the implication of design and
adoption of information and communication technology
(ICT) in society. Concepts and principles of the CA are
drawn upon to discuss the means and ends of ICT for
development (Garai and Shadrach 2006), evaluation of ICT
projects (Madon 2004), empowerment (Johnstone 2007;
Gigler 2004), the global digital divide (Wresch 2009),
social inclusion (Zheng and Walsham 2008), and theoret-
ical exploration on applying the CA on ICT and human
development (Zheng 2009; Kleine 2009).
From a CA perspective of ICT technology is typically
seen as embedded in the process of human development
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This means that its purpose is to enhance the capabilities of
individuals to lead a life in ways that they have reasons to
value. Technology is not seen as an end in itself (Zheng
2009). Moreover, the central role of ‘‘agency’’ in Sen’s
capability approach allows us to challenge the perception
of potential users of ICT as passive receivers of innova-
tions, especially when technologies are transferred to the
third world from more advanced economies (Walsham
2001), and when technologies are imposed on local users
under the claims that these particular technologies are
‘‘good for them’’ (Bailur 2007). Applying Sen’s CA to ICT
for development, the agency of ICT users is emphasised,
thus highlighting the needs and aspirations of the people
whose interests are affected by the innovations. Zheng
(2009) suggests incorporating individual agency in study-
ing ICT for development (ICTD) has two consequences.
The first relates to the need for public discussions, partic-
ipation, and social inclusion in the process of ICT adoption
and diffusion. The second relates to the evaluation of ICT
adoption in terms of the extent to which it meets the needs
and expectations of users (Madon 2004), rather than the
rate of diffusion, the extent to which it fulfils the intentions
of the designers, or economic outcomes.
On the whole the literature applying Sen’s capability
approach to ICTD is at an early stage, and there is plenty of
space for such work to develop conceptually, theoretically
and methodologically. In this paper we explore two con-
ceptual issues. Firstly, almost all of the work that incor-
porates ICT into the CA framework has an implicit
perception of technologies as goods and resources, which
are independent of values and beliefs. For example, Zheng
(2009) proposes a view of seeing ICT as commodities. This
view is meaningful in light of ICT’s contribution to the
users’ capability set, i.e. the real opportunities that the
individual has to lead a life he or she considers valuable.
Such a view implies that technology is neutral and can be
readily drawn upon to serve the purposes of human
development. While this may be valid at some level—and
is useful to steer the discourse away from the perception
that technological innovation is a valuable end in its own
right—the neutrality assumption could be overly simplistic
and problematic at other levels. Scholars of science and
technology studies and information systems are very likely
to protest against it. It is therefore appropriate to ask
whether there is space for a more sophisticated and critical
view of technology.
Another aspect to be mentioned here is the notion of
individual agency, which Sen considers essential to
addressing deprivations of capabilities. Sen defines agency
as the freedom to set and pursue one’s own goals and
interests, which underlines his concept of development:
‘‘[d]evelopment consists of the removal of various types of
unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little
opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency (Sen 1999,
xii).’’ While it is recognised that individual agency is
embedded in specific socio-cultural environment (Sen
1990a, 2006), and that there is still space for the agency to
be evaluated and appraised (Sen 1985b), Sen is reluctant to
theorise how individual agency is restricted and what this
means for operationalising the CA. This seems to be one of
the areas of the CA that have been left ‘‘incomplete’’
(Robeyns 2006). As Deneulin (2006) points out,
If the capability approach is a theory guiding and
assessing development policies according to the
capabilities people have reason to choose and value,
given the structures of inequality within which people
express their ‘good reasons’ to value certain capa-
bilities, it seems that the approach crucially requires a
critical account of the ‘good reasons’ people may
have to value certain capabilities (ibid., p. 32).
To address these issues we propose to draw upon critical
theory (CT) and see whether there are elements from this
school of thought that can shed light on a more critical
account of both technology and individual agency when
applying the capability approach to ICTD. The reason we
choose critical theory is that it is similar to the capability
approach in many respects. They both constitute schools of
thought that are meant to make a difference—to improve
individual and social lives; both are normative theories
rooted in ethics; they share an interest in democracy, and
both are concerned with the pursuit of ‘‘a good life’’. They
develop different streams of ideas to support freedom,
empowerment and emancipation. It is thus a reasonable
question to ask whether and in what ways these two
approaches can learn from each other. In this paper we
focus on what the CA can learn from CT.
Both approaches defy simple definitions. Sen’s CA was
intentionally left incomplete (Robeyns 2006), and has been
extended, enriched and applied by various scholars from
several disciplines. CT is used as a label for a rich body of
theories which encompass diverse critical approaches and
methodologies. Bearing the diversity and complexity in
mind, for the purpose of simplicity of this paper, we will
refer to them as though they were singular theories, but will
elaborate on internal differences where necessary.
The rest of the paper starts by reviewing the capability
approach and ICT, followed by an introduction to critical
work in information systems and technology. The sub-
sequent section explores in detail aspects of critical theory
in terms of their contribution to applying Sen’s capability
approach to technological innovations, including concep-
tion of technology, agency and methodological issues. The
paper concludes by pointing towards ways in which the
cross-fertilisation of CT and CA can lead to tangible results
that further both research agendas.
Y. Zheng, B. C. Stahl
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Capability approach, critical theory, and technology
This section provides the theoretical background of the
main thesis of the paper. It outlines the key characteristics
of CA and CT in relation to the role of technology. It is
regrettable that we are not able to go into great details to
introduce both theories due to space limit—interested
readers are encouraged to follow the references.
Sen’s capability approach
Sen’s capability approach was developed and refined over
three decades, after the Tanner lecture in 1979, in a number
of books and journal articles across disciplines (e.g. Sen
1980, 1982, 1993, 1999). As most of Sen’s work addresses
the field of economics, it is not easily accessible to a wider
audience. His writings on the topic have been synthesised
by various authors including Alkire (2002) and Robeyns
(2002). The major constituents of the capability approach
are ‘‘functionings’’ and ‘‘capabilities’’. Functionings are the
‘‘beings and doings’’ of a person, whereas a person’s
capability is ‘‘the various combinations of functionings that
a person can achieve. Capability is thus a set of vectors of
functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one
type of life or another’’ (Sen 1992, p. 40). The two concepts
are interrelated but have distinct meanings:
A functioning is an achievement, whereas a capa-
bility is the ability to achieve. Functionings are, in a
sense, more directly related to living conditions, since
they are different aspects of living conditions.
Capabilities, in contrast, are notions of freedom, in
the positive sense: what real opportunities you have
regarding the life you may lead (Sen 1987, p. 36)
In other words, functionings are considered constitutive of
well-being, and refer to realised achievements and fulfilled
expectations; whereas the notion of capabilities ‘‘represents
a person’s freedom to achieve well-being’’ (ibid. p. 49,
original italics), and refers to effective possibilities of
realising achievements and fulfilling expectations. Thus,
the CA is not only concerned with the functioning levels of
people, but more importantly with their capabilities.
Based on the distinction between functionings and
capabilities, the CA is different from other economic
approaches to poverty, inequality and justice by distin-
guishing ‘‘means to achieve’’ (what one values), ‘‘freedom
to achieve’’, and ‘‘actual achievement’’ (Sen 1990b, 1992).
While approaches that focus on commodity demand or
level of income only address the means of achievement, the
CA puts the ‘‘freedom to achieve’’ at the central stage of
assessment. It is on this basis that Zheng (2009) concep-
tualises ICT to be a type of commodity that serves as
‘‘means to achieve’’, distinguishing it from the ‘‘the
freedom to achieve’’, namely, the capability set of the
individuals that enable them to take advantage of goods
and resources towards furthering their valued goals in life.
The actual achievement of functionings is a result of per-
sonal choice, subject to personal preferences and other
factors of decision-making mechanisms, from the capa-
bilities available. It is recognised that the extent to which
people can generate capabilities from goods and services
are influenced by three sets of conversion factors—per-
sonal, social, and environmental characteristics (Sen 1992,
pp. 79–87).
The consideration of interpersonal variations among
human beings differentiates the capability approach from
other theories in that it explicitly distinguishes different
spaces of equality. Equality in one space to lead a valu-
able life, e.g. income, does not necessarily mean equality
in life opportunities to achieve it, e.g. access to quality
healthcare (Sen 1985a). This has great significance in
assessing inequality, hence the question ‘‘equality of
what?’’, which Sen argues is ‘‘truly central to under-
standing the distinction between different ethical approa-
ches to social arrangements’’ (Sen 1992, p. 130). The
capability approach thus proposes a different ‘‘evaluative
space’’ (Sen 1993, p. 33), i.e. the plurality of functionings
and capabilities, as opposed to income, utility or desire-
fulfilment in traditional approaches. From this perspec-
tive, poverty should be seen as ‘‘the deprivation of basic
capabilities rather than merely as lowness of incomes
(Sen 1999, p. 87)’’, which is only of instrumental
importance. One example Sen often uses is that African
Americans in the United States, though richer than people
in the third world, have ‘‘absolutely’’ lower chance to
reach mature age than people in, say, China, Sri Lanka or
parts of India (Sen 1999).
The concept of agency is fundamental in seeing Sen’s
focus on substantive individual freedom—what the person
is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or
values he or she regards as important (Sen 1985b, p. 203).
In other words, an individual is an ‘‘agent’’, as opposed to a
‘‘patient’’ whose well-being or the absence of well-being is
the only concern (Robeyns 2005). There are two aspects of
‘‘substantive individual freedom’’: ‘‘well-being freedom’’
and ‘‘agency freedom’’ (Sen 1992, p. 57). The former is
one’s freedom to achieve things that are constitutive of
one’s well-being, while the latter is one’s freedom to
‘‘bring about the achievements one values and which one
attempts to produce’’ (ibid.), which may include furthering
the well-being of others, respecting social and moral
norms, or acting upon personal commitments and the
pursuit of a variety of values. The centrality of agency in
Sen’s capability approach critically differentiates it from
Nussbaum (2000)’s capability approach, which defines a
concrete list of basic capabilities. Instead, Sen insists that
Technology, capabilities and critical perspectives
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the list and weighting of valued capabilities should be
defined by individuals themselves. We will explore Sen’s
concept of agency further in the next section.
Capabilities studies have thrived in the last decade and
progress has been made in applying the CA in empirical
studies (see e.g. Clark 2006; Robeyns 2006; Gasper 2007
for more detailed discussions). In general, the capability
approach has provided an invaluable analytical and philo-
sophical foundation to be built on (Evans 2002), and a
conceptual basis upon which many critical issues and
embedded relationships are sensitised for investigation.
Therefore the CA is not only applicable in empirical
studies, but also can be drawn upon for purposes of ana-
lytical reasoning or as a critical lens.
The capability approach is relatively new to the social
studies of ICT. One of the earlier applications is shown by
Madon (2004) who adopts the capability approach to go
beyond traditional evaluation criteria on e-governance
initiatives in the state of Kerala, India. Rather than mea-
suring only expenditure, infrastructure, access and skills,
she argues that we should also look at what people can or
cannot do with the ICT applications offered, and how
effectively people benefit from them. Johnstone (2007)
seeks to broaden the research agenda of computer ethics by
drawing insights from the CA. More recently, Zheng and
Walsham (2008) apply concepts of the CA to examine how
social exclusion in the e-society can manifest as inequali-
ties in many different ‘‘spaces’’. A more systematic
investigation of the CA in the IS field is provided by Zheng
(2009) who presents an overview of the CA for ICT
researchers and explores different ways of applying a CA
perspective to studying the role of ICT in socio-economic
development. Kleine (2009) presents the Choice Frame-
work as a way to operationalise the Capability Approach to
development. Overall, the application of the CA in IS
research is at an early stage and is in need of further
exploration and development.
Critical theory of ICT
Critical theory has a rich history and spans a large number
of approaches to research. In this paper we are predomi-
nantly interested in critical theory as it pertains to and has
been applied to ICT and information systems. There are
two clearly recognisable critical discourses in ICT, namely
critical research in information systems, a discourse pre-
dominantly among information systems scholars, and
critical theory of technology, which is supported by phi-
losophers of technology. This section will review both
discourses and synthesise them under the heading of
‘‘critical theory of ICT’’.
Critical social research in information systems
Information systems (IS) is a field of practice but also of
academic inquiry. It is often defined by the interrelation of
technical and social aspects. The critical approach to
information systems is often presented in terms of a
‘‘research paradigm’’ (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991) as
distinct from interpretivist and positivist IS research. While
there has been some activity in critical research in IS since
the 1980s, the level of activity and visibility has recently
picked up with the publication of several dedicated vol-
umes (Howcroft and Trauth 2005; Stahl 2008a; Brooke
2009) and special journal issues. Topics range from the
perspectives of post-colonial influences (Mayasandra et al.
2006), gender (Howcroft and Trauth 2008), to discourses
and power relationships (Jackson et al. 2006).
Stahl (2008b) suggests that the critical intention is core
to CSISR. It is based on the perception that social reality
can be improved and that research has the task to engage in
this. Cecez-Kecmanovic (2005, p. 19) puts it as follows:
‘‘Critical IS researchers produce knowledge with the aim
of revealing and explaining how information systems are
(mis)used to enhance control, domination and oppression,
and thereby to inform and inspire transformative social
practices that realise the liberating and emancipatory
potential of information systems.’’ This introduces the core
concept behind the critical intention, namely that of
emancipation. Critical IS scholars tend to acknowledge that
emancipation is a core concern of the critical approach,
although this raises issues such as the definition of eman-
cipation, what counts as domination or alienation, who is to
identify this, as well as the role of the critical scholar in
identifying and addressing problems of emancipation
(Stahl 2006).
It should be noted that critical theory, even in a rela-
tively clearly circumscribed field such as CSISR, can better
be understood as an umbrella label covering different
theoretical approaches. According to Harvey (1990),
aspects of critical theory can be traced back to Antiquity.
However, a typical meaning of the term is that it is theory
that has been inspired by Marxist critique of capitalism.
More specifically, the term critical theory is often linked to
work related to the Frankfurt School of social research
(Falconer 2008). However, there has been some reaction to
the dominance of Frankfurt School work, and particularly
the dominance of work inspired by Habermas in CSISR
(Brooke 2002). In current CSISR discourses one can
therefore find references to a wider body of theories. Work
inspired by Michel Foucault has a strong presence and
further theoretical references to a wide range of work, such
as critical management studies, postcolonial theory and
others can be found.
Y. Zheng, B. C. Stahl
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Critical theory of technology
In addition to CSISR there is another discourse on critical
work in relation to technology, which draws on similar
sources and shares similar concerns, but appears to be
largely separate from the CSISR discourses. We refer to
this body of work as the critical theory of technology
(CTT). A central figure of CTT is Feenberg (1993, 1999,
2004, 2008a, b), a student of Marcuse’s, who has built
much of his work on early Frankfurt School work. How-
ever, the strong initial influence of the Frankfurt School has
been supplemented by work of Heidegger and Ellul as well
as postmodernists, constructivists and others (Radder
2008).
CTT seems to be more closely linked to philosophy as a
reference discipline than CSISR, which has a stronger
affinity to a sociological background. Not surprisingly,
CTT thus covers philosophical topics such as the concep-
tual basis and the ontological nature of technology. The
nature of technology is a core concern of CTT. Technology
is generally recognised as being socially shaped and con-
structed. The eventual shape that a technology takes is
dependent on the fit between devices and interest and
beliefs of social groups (Feenberg 1999). Technology is not
neutral but includes values and preferences.
An important aspect of this non-neutrality of technology
is its relation to power. Technology represents power and
can be more powerful than political power. Technology can
be used to delegate power. This view reflects Marcuse’s
(2002 [1964], p. xlvi) observation that ‘‘Technology serves
to institute new, more effective, and more pleasant forms of
social control and social cohesion.’’ CTT emphasises the
ambiguity of technology, the fact that it can be used for
rationalising power structures as well as instituting
empowerment. The way in which these affordances are
realised is strongly influenced by the socio-economic
environment in which technologies are developed and
used. CTT therefore has an interest in the way in which
capitalist structures facilitate or obstruct the achievement
of potentials.
Commonalities of the critical approaches: CTICT
A more in-depth comparison of the two discourses in
CSISR and CTT would be desirable as a contribution to an
overall critical theory of technology but this would lead
beyond the confines of the present paper. For the purposes
of the current paper it will suffice to extract some features
they share, in particular with regards to ICT. We will call
this amalgamation of CTT and CSISR the critical theory of
ICT (CTICT).
CTICT stands for the recognition that ICT has the
potential to improve social reality and promote
emancipation but often has opposite effects. Critical
research aims to address this by epistemological means
(e.g. exploring the nature and consequences of ICT) but
aims to go beyond this. The awareness of the socially
constructed nature of technology, the ability to describe
interpretive flexibility lead to a sensitivity of the relation-
ship between technology and power. Social and economic
structures influence the values on which technologies are
built and thereby the affordances they offer to users. These
insights have both theoretical and practical relevance and
would be able to inform our design and use of technology
in order to contribute to the development of a better
society.
This shared ethical goal of CTICT simultaneously raises
important questions. What is the role of research and the
researcher in the process of emancipation? How can we
determine states of emancipation? How can different views
on such questions be reconciled? How can research make a
practical difference and simultaneously avoid turning into
the dictatorship of the intellectual? These are fundamental
questions arising from the nature of CTICT. In this paper
we argue that the capability approach can provide tentative
answers to some of them.
What CA can learn from CT
Having briefly introduced the two theoretical approaches to
be discussed in this paper, we can now proceed to the
discussion of the way in which the capability approach can
learn from critical theory. They are both ethical theories in
the sense that they provide concepts to understand and
describe shortcomings of current social arrangements.
They both aim to contribute to a better world. Neither of
them provide strong moral guidance on what should be
done or how but a theoretical and procedural way of
understanding the world. Meanwhile, the two have very
different repertoire of concepts and vocabulary which may
inform each other. While this discussion is based on gen-
eral and philosophical considerations, we emphasise the
specific relevance of CA and CT in the area of ICT.
Agency, ideology and hegemony
The ultimate goal of development, according to the capa-
bility approach, is the expansion of individual freedom,
that is, for individuals to lead a life that they consider
valuable. The aspect of ‘‘agency freedom’’, which is a core
feature of the CA, was not very well developed partly
because it is particularly difficult to operationalise (Gasper
2007). Most development approaches have concentrated on
the well-being aspect, such as income, education, and
healthcare. Even in the Human Development Reports
Technology, capabilities and critical perspectives
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which adopt the capability approach as a conceptual
framework, the focus has been on the well-being aspect of
human development and the agency aspect has been much
less appreciated. In response to the neglect of agency
freedom and agency achievement in political discourses
and interpretation of Sen’s work, Crocker (2008) proposes
the label of the ‘‘the agency-focused capability approach’’
or ‘‘an agent-oriented approach’’.
The emphasis on individual agency gives rise to the
critique of Sen’s work as being overly individualistic, and
paying insufficient attention to groups and social structures
(e.g. Corbridge 2002; Devereux 2001; Navarro 2000;
Deneulin et al. 2006). In fact, Sen explicitly takes into
account social environment, societal structures, and culture
by distinguishing between the concepts of functionings and
capabilities, and by recognising the conversion factors
from resources to functionings (Robeyns 2005). For
example, on the topic of identity and violence, Sen (2006)
expresses concern with deprivation of the freedom to think
and the freedom of choice due to singular identification
with a particular ethnic group, religion, or way of living.
While such restrictive views of identity are often historical
legacies, they are also partly results of social policies. In
his research on gender inequality in India, Sen (1990a)
argues that the fact that married women tend to value their
contribution to the household as lower than their bread-
winner husband is based on general social perceptions of
market evaluations of work, and hence the gender contri-
butions to social goods. Such a tendency is further com-
pounded by their already low bargaining power in the
family, thus resulting in their resignation to fate. As Sen
eloquently puts it,
The most blatant forms of inequalities and exploita-
tions survive in the world through making allies out
of the deprived and the exploited. The underdog
learns to bear the burden so well that he or she
overlooks the burden itself. Discontent is replaced by
acceptance, hopeless rebellion by conformist quiet,
and—most relevantly in the present context—suf-
fering and anger by cheerful endurance. As people
learn to adjust to the existing horrors by the sheer
necessity of uneventful survival, the horrors look less
terrible in the metric of utilities (Sen 1984).
Sen thus has an implicit concern with power relations and
unjust social structures, yet does not provide a full account
and theorisation of societal structures and constraints on
personal choices. This is one of the areas that CA remains
open and needs to be complemented by other theories.
Robeyns (2008) points out that one could use the capability
approach with theories of choice and personal responsibil-
ity that do not acknowledge societal structures and
constraints, which will have ultimately far reaching
consequences for evaluative exercises.
In complimentary to this ‘‘weakness’’ of the capability
approach, critical theory focuses on the structural condi-
tions of individual agency. Of primary importance among
those conditions is the economic constitution of society, or,
to put it differently, the way in which capitalist systems
structure agents’ options. Critical scholars tend to point to
the importance of historical backgrounds in understanding
social situations. They tend to underline the importance of
social structures in enabling or denying emancipation, that
is, the ideological character of social structures which limit
personal freedoms.
Critical theory provides a rich theoretical repertoire in
relation to the constraints and boundedness of human
agency. Two central concepts in this vocabulary of CT are
ideology and hegemony. Ideologies are particular and
dominant worldviews that advantage some and disadvan-
tage others (Freeden 2003; Hawkes 2003; McLellan 1995).
Ideologies are not simply falsehoods. Rather, they consti-
tute central parts of the shared worldview of a society or
group (Stewart and Gosain 2006). As such they can often
even be supported by empirical evidence (Gouldner 1976).
They are accepted by that group or society as correct
descriptions of reality. However, from a critical perspective
they can be seen as partial and alienating. Good examples
of ideologies are the stereotypes linked to race and gender.
Such stereotypes, if generally accepted, structure the
actions available to members of a particular race or gender,
which can be oppressive.
Addressing ideology is not a simple solution but an
ongoing process which pervades critical research. Ideolo-
gies can only persist if they evade critical questioning and
analysis. They must blend into the background in order to
remain stable. The mechanism by which this is achieved is
sometimes called hegemony. Hegemony renders ideology
invisible, often by rending it natural and beyond discus-
sion. The concept of hegemony is closely linked to
Gramsci’s work whose main question was why people
acquiesced to the oppression they were subjected to
(Kincheloe and McLaren 2005). Foucault (1977, 1980) also
famously argues that inequalities and power relations
operate not solely through direct forms of repression but
often through less visible strategies of normalisation, as in
the panopticon metaphor.
Deneulin (2006) draws upon Ricoeur’s ethical vision to
improve Sen’s notion of individual agency to that of
social–historical agency, which refers to what human
beings can really do or be given the particular socio-
historical structures in which they are living. We propose
the concept of situated agency to express the idea
that individual agency is not only a product of specific
Y. Zheng, B. C. Stahl
123
socio-historical settings, but also situated in a sometimes
invisible or taken-for-granted network of ideology, and
participate in the production and reproduction of these
socio-historical structures and ideological tenets. Such a
concept has important implications for ICT and social
development, as it gives rise to a sensitivity towards deep-
seated power structure and rationalities. For example, an
participatory approach to development, which Sen himself
strongly advocates and which is popular in most devel-
opment projects, may disguise or even strengthen incipi-
ent articulation of power embedded in social and cultural
practices, hence the ‘‘tyranny of participation’’ (Cooke
and Kothari 2001). It is possible that participatory meth-
odologies may reify existing inequalities and affirm the
agenda of elites and other more powerful actors (Kothari
2001). In studies of ICT and development, social condi-
tions and cultural values are often perceived as merely
contexts of ICT adoption, or sometimes as barriers
(Walsham 2001). A critical capability approach that
conceptually and methodologically incorporates situated
agency as a key element would allow us to critically
evaluate the design of social arrangement and of the basis
of cultural norms as part of the assessment of well-being
and agency freedom.
Technology, capabilities and critical perspectives
The Critical Theory of ICT can be used in addition to the
capability approach in the assessment of motivations for
adoption and social consequences of ICT in modern life.
One of the concerns of CTICT is how technology can be
subjected to democratic control. Again, this takes up a
theme formulated by scholars of the Frankfurt School such
as Habermas or Marcuse and tries to find present solutions
to it. This requires a better understanding of the nature of
technology and overcoming determinist positions such as
those of Heidegger and Ellul. It raises practical issues
concerning the design and regulation of technology.
Importantly, it explicitly covers political questions of how
democratic ideals can be brought to bear on modern socio-
technical systems. This may point to participative devel-
opment approaches but even introduce an element of
Luddism (Schot and Rip 1996, p. 264) into political
debates surrounding technology, where Luddism is under-
stood as an approach to ‘‘create and maintain space for
sociotechnical criticism’’.
Work in CTICT is also strong in pointing out areas and
issues of alienation and oppression and the different roles
that technology can play in this. Typical topics of interest
are those that affect emancipation or its potential. Prime
among them are power-related issues, in particular those
where power is related to technology. Examples are control
and surveillance technologies. Brey (2008) posits that a
critical (political) theory of technology has to provide
answers to the following four questions:
• The theoretical question: how can technology play a
role in the distribution and exercise of power?
• The factual question: what is the role of technology in
the distribution and exercise of power in contemporary
society?
• The normative question: what role should technology
have in the distribution and exercise of power in
society?
• The practical question: what steps can be taken to move
closer to this ideal?
CTICT therefore explicitly and directly addresses the issue
of technology and distribution of power, which is exactly
what is lacking in the capability approach. Another
contribution of CTICT is revealing technology’s ideolog-
ical qualities and hegemonic functions. Ideologies may be
socially accepted views such as the legitimacy of hierar-
chical management or of the imperative of profit maximi-
sation. Ideologies are part of all collective constructions of
reality and therefore a necessary consequence of a social
constructivist worldview. They may even have positive
consequences when they allow for the development of
positive views of experiences (McAulay et al. 2002).
Technology can then serve as hegemonic means by
supporting and rendering invisible such ideologies (Sara-
vanamuthu 2002; Feenberg 1999). At the same time,
technology itself can have an ideological status, for
example when technology is equated with progress and
progress is assumed to be unquestionably desirable; when
technology represents ‘‘expert knowledge’’ that exercises
‘‘disciplinary power’’ (Foucault 1980); or when technology
embodies contested social regulations, for example through
digital rights management. Hegemonic means to uphold the
ideological quality of technology can then be drawn from
the environment in the form of customs, agreements, or the
law.
A heightened sensitivity towards the interpretive flexi-
bility of technology, the hegemonic potential of ICT and its
role in (re)configuring distribution of power may be able to
help address the lack of recognition of technological
agency and power relations when applying the CA on
technological changes and social development.
Methodological issues
A further area where critical theory may be able to make a
contribution to the operationalisation of the capability
approach lies with methodology. There are numerous
attempts to operationalise CA, which has led to the
development of a considerable literature. When talking
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about methodologies of applying the CA the literature
usually refers to the accumulated quantitative and quali-
tative methods of identifying and measuring capabilities
(Anand et al. 2007). For example, Alkire’s (2002) book
Valuing Freedom takes Sen’s capability approach forward
to develop a framework for specifying valuable capabili-
ties, applied to cases studies of non-governmental organi-
sation activities of poverty reduction. In terms of policy
application, the capability approach has provided the
foundations of the human development approach adopted
by the United Nations Development Program as reflected
by the Human Development Index.
However this is certainly not the only way the CA can
be applied. Robeyns (2006) categorises ten types of exist-
ing capability applications: general assessment of human
development of a country; assessment of small scale
development projects; identification of the poor in devel-
oping countries; poverty and well-being assessments in
advanced economies; an analysis of deprivation of disabled
people; the assessment of gender inequalities; theoretical
and empirical analyses of policies; critiques on social
norms, practices and discourses; and finally, the use of
functionings and capabilities as concepts in non-normative
research.
CTICT does not have a clearly established methodol-
ogy, which can be seen as regrettable (McGrath 2005) but
it is arguably a consequence of the very idea of critical
theory, namely to question assumptions and beliefs
including the reflexive questioning of beliefs of the
researcher. Indeed, the core principles of critical research
have important methodological implications in the design
of theoretical and empirical social research of ICT. As
Feldman (2010) rightly points out, ‘‘to avoid the pitfalls of
institutionalising capabilities in ways that limit it to a
technical assessment or measurement tool, it is crucial to
remain attentive to the power and political interests that
help to constitute its meanings and practices.’’
To retain a critical consciousness in operationalising the
capability approach, it may be useful to refer to the six
criteria that suggest that a piece of research must fulfil in
order to count as critical (Klein 2009; Basden 2002):
1. Being concerned with the conditions of human exis-
tence that facilitate the realisation of human needs and
potentials;
2. Supporting a process of critical self-reflection and
associated self-transformation;
3. Being sensitive to a broader set of institutional issues
relating particularly to social justice, due process and
human freedom;
4. Incorporating explicit principles of evidence given (or
an explicit truth theory) for the evaluation of claims
made throughout the research process;
5. Incorporating principles of fallibility and self-correc-
tion (growth of knowledge through criticism, i.e. the
principle of fallibilism);
6. Being suggestive of how the critique of social
conditions or practices could be met (as a safeguard
against unrealistic and destructive negativism).
Based on these principles, the first question that
researchers need to ask concerns the status of empirical
data. If capabilities research is normative, i.e. wants to
change the world, then one has to determine what role
empirical research can play. From a critical perspective,
knowledge of social realities and perceptions is important
to identify where emancipation can be promoted. Such
knowledge cannot necessarily determine, however, how
emancipation can be promoted. Where methodologies are
seen in the positivist tradition as means of ensuring a
positive outcome of research they can easily turn into
ideologies themselves (Wastell 1996).
The methodologies typically employed with critical
theory can be helpful in dealing with ICT. Critical work
that looks at the linguistic construction of technology is
important to unpack black boxes that determine affor-
dances and mediations of technology. This type of work is
closely aligned with some of the work currently done in
ethics and ICT, such as disclosive ethics (Brey 2000; Int-
rona 2005). An understanding of how language is used to
portray particular technologies and projected developments
can also be conducive to better design of technologies,
such as suggested by value-sensitive design (van den
Hoven 2008).
CA-based methods seem to be uniquely suited to
describing technologies and evaluating different options.
Many ICTs have potentially far-ranging consequences and
design decisions that aim to be conducive to justice and
emancipation have to rely on some sort of measure that will
allow comparisons of different options or outcomes.
Examples of this could include design decisions in tech-
nology development such as ambient intelligence applica-
tions or action choices in technically relevant social action.
Such work could be supported and underpinned by critical
perspectives, for example by questioning participants’ or
experts’ opinions or conducting ideology critiques of
capability measures.
A further point of interest is that of reflexivity. Reflex-
ivity is often described as a core characteristic of the
critical approach (Kvasny and Richardson 2006; Richard-
son and Robinson 2007; Doolin and McLeod 2005). This is
based on the recognition that ideologies, hegemonies,
prejudices, reifications etc. cannot be overcome. Reflexiv-
ity allows critical scholars to engage in discourses without
falling prey to the same problems that they diagnose in
non-critical work. Being open to question one’s own
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assumptions means that one has the ability to recognise
where these assumptions have ideological and alienating
qualities and thus prevent emancipation. It also means that
alternative concepts and views can be developed which
overcome these problems.
This explicit reflection on ideology and hegemony and
many of the related factors that allow ideologies to persist
might benefit capabilities scholars. An essentialist take of
the capability approach or a simplistic and mechanistic
application of the CA as a measurement tool could
potentially lead to the reification of beliefs and assumptions
about human development and thereby take on a hege-
monic role. The contribution to this problem from the
viewpoint of CT can be to provide a model of how
reflexivity as the continuous attempt to question the basis
of the research can be embedded into research projects. It
would probably require critical questioning of the CA by
the individuals involved in it. This continuous reflexivity
should lead to discourses that allow exposing and
addressing issues such as ideology, hegemony, reification,
false consciousness etc. This will not solve them and make
them go away but will ensure that they are recognised and
considered. In addition to thinking about what human
capabilities are and how they can be observed, it will
require asking which assumptions the answer to these
questions are based on. By introducing such an explicit
critical reflection as a standard component of CA-related
work, the danger of this approach being perceived as a
simple tool and of becoming reified in its own right could
be avoided.
Conclusion
This paper argues that what we refer to as critical theory of
ICT can be a good supplement to the capability approach in
addressing issues related to technology and human devel-
opment. The CA and CT are similar in several aspects,
most notably in their attempt to contribute to a better
world. Both theories have advantages and weak points. The
capability approach is more clearly grounded in ethical
theory through its link to concepts of justice and has found
different ways to be empirically applied and measureable.
Critical theory, on the other hand, builds on a long tradition
of determining the obstacles to emancipation, be they
social or individual, and having developed an important
repertoire of concepts that scholars can build on.
If this description of CA and CT as being similar in
substance and intent is correct, then it stands to reason that
both could learn from taking the other into account. This is
not to suggest that we need a unified theory to replace
either CA or CT, but rather that there are ways of over-
coming blind spots that all theories naturally have. We
have argued that bringing perspectives from the critical
theory of ICT to the CA without combining the two the-
ories already generates valuable insights to the application
of the capability approach on ICT and development.
In this paper we have discussed three areas where crit-
ical theory can make a contribution to the capability
approach. Firstly, CT provides a critical account of indi-
vidual agency—we propose the concept of situated agency
to signify individual agency not only as a product of spe-
cific socio-historical settings, but also subjected to hege-
mony of ideologies (e.g. values, beliefs, knowledge
systems), and involved in the production and reproduction
of these socio-historical structures and ideological tenets.
Secondly, CT provides a more sophisticated and critical
account of technology beyond the simplistic notion of
goods and resources; highlighting the interpretive flexibil-
ity and hegemonic potential of technology and its entan-
glement in power relationships. Thirdly, CT generates
some methodological implications that can reduce the risk
of the CA being applied as a simplistic measurement tool
by sensitising it towards reification and hegemonic poten-
tial of scientific methods, and emphasising the reflexivity
of researchers.
Table 1 summarises the topics covered in this paper
where critical theory or CTICT can contribute to the
application of the capability approach on technology and
development.
Meanwhile, critical scholars could benefit from the CA’s
insight into real freedoms and use this insight to move
towards more constructive forms of critique. Giving more
weight to the positive side of technology might allow for a
more balanced view. In many cases CTICT tries to debunk
positive myths by showing that there are alternative stories
to be told, for example by Cukier et al. (2009) who show
the one-sidedness of media coverage of e-teaching or by
Greenhill and Wilson (2006) who argue that the positive
depiction of telework is misleading. While these inter-
ventions from the critical perspective are important and
valuable, they may run the risk of being one-sided in the
other direction. This is not a fundamental problem for
critical scholars who would generally be sceptical of claims
to objective description, but it may run the risk of alien-
ating individuals who enjoy and benefit from particular
ICTs. Critical scholars need to recognise that positive
appreciations of technology or the socio-economic back-
ground they come from are not necessarily expressions of
false consciousness but may be genuine and deserving of
respect (as Thrift (2005) argues for capitalism). By seeing
ICT as means to development and asking questions about
what conversion factors need to be in place to facilitate the
achievement of potential freedom that technology provides,
the CA may point to a constructive way of engaging in
such discourses.
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The next step will be to engage in empirical research
that uses the conceptual argument put forward in the
present paper. As both CA and CT aim to be applied and
practical, such empirical research will be the natural way of
finding out whether the complementarity of the two
approaches truly lends itself to improving practical out-
comes. An important topic is to evaluate the impact of
technology on development from a critical capabilities
perspective. Other research topics include the socio-eco-
nomic basis of technology for development, in particular
issues surrounding the capitalist structure of societies and
organisations employing information systems. This
includes classical topics such as gender, race, class but also
managerialism or digital divides and the discourses on ICT
adoption and social development. We hope that the present
paper provides some conceptual guidance that will be
conducive to both work building on CA and CT in social
studies of ICT and beyond.
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